Author: Heinrich Louw. On 21 October 2016 judgment was handed down by the High Court (Gauteng Division, Pretoria) in the matter of BMW South Africa (Pty) Ltd v The Commissioner of the South African Revenue Service (as yet unreported). Briefly, the applicant (Applicant) was a vendor for purposes of Value-added Tax (VAT). The respondent, being the South African Revenue Service (SARS), had made a finding that the Applicant did not pay certain amounts of VAT due in respect of the October 2011 to February 2012 VAT periods.
Authors: Louis Botha, Heinrich Louw and Mark Morgan. On 4 November 2016 judgment was handed down by the Tax Court of South Africa (held in Cape Town) in the matter of ABC Holdings (Pty) Ltd v The Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service, Case number ITI13772. In this case the court had to consider whether the taxpayer, ABC Holdings (Pty) Ltd, was entitled to claim a deductible allowance of enhancement income of R9,354,458.00 received in terms of a contract for future expenditure in terms of s24C of the Income Tax Act, No 58 of 1962 (Act) for its 2011 year of assessment. The other issue that arose in this case and which is the focus of this article, was whether the South African Revenue Service (SARS) was correct to levy an understatement penalty in the circumstances.
When disputing a tax debt, especially one involving the complex issue of unlawful tax avoidance, taxpayers should always exercise great caution. This sentiment is echoed by the recent judgment in Dale v Aeronastic Properties Ltd (Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service and Others Intervening) (9297/2016)  ZAWCHC 160 (25 October 2016). Although the court in this case was concerned with whether an order to place the respondent taxpayer, Aeronastic Properties Ltd (Aeronastic), under business rescue, its precarious financial situation was caused largely by an expensive tax debt. In the course of its judgment, the court made reference to the taxpayer’s dispute with the South African Revenue Service (SARS), which dispute is the subject of this article.
Author: Louis Botha (Cliffe Dekker). A certain question has been the subject of a number of recent court cases: Is an interim order or a decision which does not dispose finally of a case appealable? The Constitutional Court recently had to answer this question in two separate cases – one involving the changing of street names in Tshwane and the other involving the provisions of the National Credit Act, No 34 of 2005. The issue has now also reared its head within a tax context in the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA). In Wingate-Pearse v CSARS (830/2015)  ZASCA 109 (1 September 2016), a taxpayer wanted to appeal, among other things, the Tax Court’s decision regarding the onus of proof and the duty to commence leading evidence.
Author: Keelen Snyders, BDO South Africa. A recent tax case highlighted the importance of taxpayers gaining an understanding of the objection process for income tax assessments issued by SARS. The case, which was contested between ABC (Pty) Ltd and the Commissioner, was concerned with the onus on the taxpayer to prove “exceptional circumstances” when objecting to an assessment issued by SARS. In terms of the Tax Administration Act (TAA), a taxpayer may object to an income tax assessment within 30 business days of the date of the assessment. If a taxpayer wishes to object after expiry of this period, a senior SARS official may extend the period by 21 business days provided SARS is satisfied that “reasonable grounds” exist for late submission.
The Tax Administration Laws Amendment Act of 2015, which was promulgated on 8 January 2016, amended section 93(1)(d) of the TAA and in future SARS will not be permitted to entertain so-called ‘requests for correction’ of tax assessments, except if SARS is satisfied that there is a (currently undefined) ‘readily apparent’ undisputed error in the assessment. It is likely that taxpayers will be severely discriminated against by this amendment. What is ‘readily apparent’ to one person may not be so to another. The number of cases in which SARS is likely to grant requests for corrections is likely to drop dramatically and a lack of consistency in interpretation between SARS’ assessors may be taken as a given.
The High Court (Gauteng Division, Pretoria) recently handed down judgment in the case of Malema v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service (76306/2015)  ZAGPPHC 263 (29 April 2016). The issue before the court was whether the South African Revenue Service (SARS) was bound to a compromise agreement entered into between the Malema (Applicant) and SARS as a result of alleged non-disclosures and misstatements made by the Applicant, who expressly warranted the truth of the facts furnished by him. The compromise agreement was concluded in accordance with the provisions of s205 of the Tax Administration Act, No 28 of 2011 (TAA).
Author: Chris de Bruyn(Candidate attorney at ENSAfrica). In the matter of ABC (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service (ITC 0038/2015) (“ABC case”), the Tax Court had to consider whether the taxpayer discharged the onus to prove that “exceptional circumstances” existed for an extension of the period allowed for the taxpayer to object to an assessment, in terms of section 104 of the Tax Administration Act, 28 of 2011 (“TAA”).
Author: Heinrich Louw (Senior Associate). In terms of s104 of the Tax Administration Act, No 28 of 2011 (Act), a taxpayer who is aggrieved by an assessment or decision of the South African Revenue Service (SARS), may object to the assessment or decision. The Act states that the objection must be lodged within 30 business days from the date of the assessment. A senior SARS official may extend this period by no more than 21 business days, unless the official “…is satisfied that exceptional circumstances exist which gave rise to the delay in lodging the objection”.
In its efforts to increase its income from tax revenue, the South African Revenue Service (SARS) sometimes applies legislative provisions in tax legislation in a manner that can best be described as tenuous. An example of this is apparent from the recent decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) in CSARS v Kluh Investments (Pty) Ltd (115/2015)  ZASCA 5 (1 March 2016).